July 2011 Archives

July 25, 2011

Employer Punished for Suing Employee in Retaliation for Employee's Public Policy Suit

Dr. Jadwin sued his employer, Kern County, in federal court, for placing him on administrative leave in retaliation for his complaints about patient care and other violations. This underlying federal case subsequently resulted in a verdict of over $500,000.00 to Dr. Jadwin.

Instead of heeding the warning of being particularly careful not to retaliate, or appear to retaliate, against an employee with a pending claim, the County of Kern threw caution to the wind and sued Dr. Jadwin in state court, claiming that the good doctor filed a false claim for $3125 in expenses. Fresno's claim against Dr. Jadwin was assigned to mandatory arbitration where Dr. Jadwin prevailed. After a variety of inappropriate maneuvering by the County, the State Court ruled that Fresno's claim was frivolous and brought to harass Dr. Jadwin.

The Court of Appeals, in County of Kern v Jadwin (July 5, 2011) --- C.A. 4th -- --, 2011 WL 2611819, affirmed the finding by the trial court that the case was frivolous and upheld the trial court's award of $50,000.00 in attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that the facts "'paint a picture . . .' of a lawsuit filed and maintained for the purpose of harassing Jadwin."

This case drives home the lesson that an employer must tread lightly once an employee has filed a claim, and should ensure that the employee is treated the same as other employees. It is equally true that, once an employee makes or anticipates making a claim of any sort, he or she should understand that his/her actions may be put under the employer's microscope, and thus the employee should use every effort to comply with all company rules and regulations and perform work in an exemplary manner while under this microscope!

Jody LeWitter
July 25, 2011

July 18, 2011

Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provision - as Pled- Protects Disclosures to Congress, Federal Agencies & Supervisors, But Not to the Press

Nicolas Tides and Matthew Neuman both worked for Boeing in the State of Washington and both were concerned that Boeing's practices violated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The two employees complained internally, on multiple occasions, that they believed the system in place at Boeing permitted unauthorized users to alter the company's internal controls rating system. Tides and Neuman, subsequently and independently, spoke to the press about their concerns, even though they were aware of a corporate policy prohibiting such conduct. Boeing fired both employees for unauthorized disclosures to the press. Both sued, claiming violations of Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower protections pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1514A(a)(1).
Unfortunately for both Mr. Tides and Mr. Neuman, 18 U.S.C. Section 1514A(a)(1) explicitly sets forth a list of the three entities or people to whom a whistleblower may report a perceived violation of the law for purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection statute, and none of these included the press. The court in Tides v The Boeing Co., --- F.4th ---- (9th Cir. May 3, 2011), sets forth the statutory protection as extended to 1. Federal regulatory or law enforcement agencies, 2. Congress, or 3. A supervisor. See 18 U.S.C. Section 1514A(a)(1). Thus, when Boeing brought a motion claiming that these employees' actions were not protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower section above, because they disclosed to the press, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Boeing.
There is some saving grace for those who face retaliation for making complaints of illegal practices in the State of California. First, learn from the mistakes above and complain to a specified person or entity under the statute. Second, if the wrongdoing violates other statutes, look at the possibility of using other statutory remedies. Third, if the wrongdoing violates the general public policy of the State of California, consider whether you might have a common law public policy claim. Lastly, if your claim is under Sarbanes-Oxley, consider using a different provision of the statute, such as 18 U.S.C. Section 1514A(a)(2). This provision protects employees who "file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating to an alleged violation of" parts of Sarbanes-Oxley. The Ninth Circuit in this case did not reach the question of whether there would have been a claim had the employees in the Tides case used that statutory provision.
Jody LeWitter
July 18, 2011


July 6, 2011

Employment, Consumer Class Actions Endangered by Supreme Court

The US Supreme Court's April 27, 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. _ is just the latest in a disturbing slide of the high court away from individual rights and liberties towards ever increasing corporate impunity.  With its Concepcion decision, the Court further rolls back one of the lasting achievements of the civil rights and environmental movements, class actions.

Class arbitration waivers are at the heart of the US Supreme Court's decision in Concepcion. At issue in the case was a rule, established by the California Supreme Court in a 2005 opinion, Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 148, that class arbitration waivers in mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements are per se unconscionable, meaning that even if someone signed such an agreement, a court would not enforce it.

The plaintiffs in Concepcion had been charged $30.22 in sales tax after being provided a supposedly free phone from AT&T. They filed a class action against AT&T for false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on phones it advertised as free.

AT&T sought to move the class action into arbitration on the basis of a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement requiring that claims be brought in the parties' individual capacities, prohibiting class proceedings. Both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit held that, based on the California Supreme Court's Discover Bank decision, the arbitration agreement was unconscionable, meaning that they would not enforce it, allowing the class action to proceed through the court system.

In its opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts' decisions.  The Court held that California's Discover Bank rule refusing to enforce class arbitration waivers in mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.

States can still hold class waivers in arbitration agreements unconscionable, and thereby unenforceable, if they go through the normal steps required in an unconscionability analysis of contracts. While this is more burdensome than the blanket Discovery Bank rule overturned by Concepcion, it can be done. The California Supreme Court, in its Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 decision, articulated several factors that go into how a court is to determine unconscionability beyond traditional unconscionability analysis, including (1) neutral arbitrators; (2) more than minimal discovery; (3) a written decision by the arbitrator; (4) all types of relief otherwise available in court; and (5) not requiring employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration process.

Have you signed an arbitration agreement? We recommend consulting a lawyer to determine how any arbitration agreements may affect your claim. Contact us for a consultation. For more information, please consult our article on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements and the Concepcion case here.

Darin Ranahan
July 6, 2011