Bay Area Employment Lawyer Blog

The California Supreme Court has laid clear, after much confusion, the proper standard by which employers must provide their employees with meal periods, imposing an affirmative burden to completely relieve their employees from duty so that the employees may take full, thirty-minute, uninterrupted meal periods. If the employer fails to meet its obligation to do so, the damaged employee is eligible for a meal period premium of an hour's worth of wages. In addition, the Court has clarified the standard by which meal period and rest break class actions may be certified and laid forth the appropriate standard for the timing of meal and rest periods.

In Brinker, the Court points out that, if an employee works five or more hours in a shift, the employer must do one of three things: (1) afford the employee an off duty meal period; (2) reach a voluntary agreement with an employee on a meal period waiver if one hour or less will end the shift; or (3) obtain written agreement to an on-duty meal period if circumstances permit. If it does none of the three, it is liable for premium pay.

In addition, the Court makes it clear that employers may not skirt their obligations, emphasizing that "an employer may not undermine a formal policy of providing meal breaks by pressuring employees to perform their duties in ways that omit breaks." The only steps an employer need not take are to "police" breaks and affirmatively ensure that no work is done.

With respect to class certification, the Court has put an abrupt halt to the disturbing trend of trial courts reaching the merits of a case at the class certification stage, before the parties have even had the opportunity to fully flesh out the evidence in a case. It clarified that a court may only look at the legal merits of a case in limited circumstances, and it reaffirmed the appropriateness of class actions in this legal area.

Lastly, the Court clarified the timing requirements for provision of meal periods, namely, that the first meal period be provided after no more than five hours of work and, for those employees who work a shift of ten hours or more, a second meal period be provided after no more than ten hours of work.

In sum, the Court clarified employees' right to a meal period, protected class actions as a way of vindicating this right, and ensured that employers do not delay meal periods until too late in a shift.

Darin Ranahan
May 9, 2012

I'm not so sure why so much attention has been paid to Sullivan v. Oracle, other than the case has been up and down and all around the court system. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Oracle, 51 Cal.4th 1191 (2011); Sullivan v. Oracle, 662 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 2011). The recent holdings (by the Ninth Circuit and California Supreme Court) that - if you work in the great State of California - you are entitled to the protections of California law including overtime and the prohibition against unfair business practices, seems rather ho-hum when you think about it.

I'm not sure what Oracle was thinking when it invited employees from other states to enjoy the sunshine in California, but then left them out in the cold when it came to the basic rights of our overtime law while working on our turf. If the courts permitted that type of conduct, wouldn't we just be encouraging employers to import cheap labor from Montana and Utah to do our work here in California? Talk about creating sweatshops right here in the golden state.

Let's look at Oracle's bold practices and inability to learn a lesson. Year after year, Oracle hired "instructors" to train customers on its products. Some of these instructors lived and worked in California; some lived and worked in other states; and some lived in other states but worked part of the time in California. Oracle classified these employees as "teachers," to make sure that these folks were exempt from overtime laws. Voila -employees worked overtime for no extra pay.

However, the employees had a better idea. They filed a class action and demanded overtime. Consequently, Oracle saw a bit of the light, and started paying its California instructors overtime under California law. Then, Oracle saw a bit more of the light, and started paying its instructors of other states overtime under federal law (the Fair Labor Standards Act, or "FLSA")for their time spent working in states other than California. Oracle held fast on its position for paying employees from other states overtime for their time spent working in California: no overtime for this! Non-California residents thus sued for the time they spent working in California, claiming they were entitled to the protection of California law while working in California, even if they were non-residents.

What did Oracle gain for holding out on this last issue? Hopefully a good lesson that it should have settled all its claims earlier on, rather than engaging in a torturous route through the entire court system including the California Supreme Court and the federal district and appeals court.

Both the California Supreme Court, in Sullivan v. Oracle, 51 Cal.4th 1191 (2011), and the Ninth Circuit, in Sullivan v. Oracle, 662 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 2011), ruled for the employees. They held that California law protects employees working in California regardless of the employees' residences in other states, and that this included the protection of California's Unfair Business Practices Act, Ca. B & P. Section 17200 et seq.

This case demonstrates that litigating a simple issue to death is not always the wisest idea!

Jody LeWitter

April 4, 2012

The conservative US Supreme Court's activist agenda is in full throttle in the mandatory arbitration arena. In the AT&T v. Concepcion case (see prior blog of July 6, 2011), the US Supreme Court planted its thumb squarely on the employer's side of the scales of justice by overturning past law and holding that there is no per se invalidation of class action arbitration provisions (Concepcion is a consumer class action case). Now the US Supreme Court apparently wishes to tip the scales at the opposite end of the spectrum: by applying this class action holding to individual Berman hearings brought by California workers for the payment of wages. The US Supreme Court has reached out and vacated (as well as remanded) the California Supreme Court's holding in Sonic-Calabasas v. Moreno (2011) 51 Cal.4th 659. Why can't the US Supreme Court stay out of our backyard?
The holding which the US Supreme Court vacated was quite modest. It simply upheld an employee's right to a "Berman hearing" before the California Labor Commissioner, pursuant to California Labor Code, section 98, for the payment of unpaid wages. Berman hearings are a streamlined administrative procedure for employees to recover unpaid wages--including overtime, meal and rest period pay, and waiting time penalties--without having to go to court, allowing many employees who cannot afford a lawyer the ability to stand up for their workplace rights. The right to a Berman hearing protected by the California Supreme Court in Sonic-Calabasas was limited to the first instance only; the California Supreme Court permitted the employer to enforce a mandatory arbitration of the employee's next step appeal, which would have otherwise taken place in the superior court.
The US Supreme Court vacated this opinion in light of Concepcion. See, Sonic-Calabasas, Inc. v Moreno (October 31, 2011) No. 10-1450. Does the US Supreme Court really believe that this minor right to an administrative hearing in the first instance should be wiped out? Does it really believe that an employer has a right to hijack a benign administrative process to entitle an employee to obtain his or her basic wages?
The US Supreme Court ought to keep its tentacles out of California' s modest procedural apparatus for an employee to obtain his or her wages. It is downright hypocritical for the Court to pay lip service to states' rights when it serves conservative interests, and ignore states' rights when it might be used to protect an employee.
We can only hope that the California Supreme Court, on remand, stands its ground. This may be high hope given the recent argument before the California Supreme Court in Brinker Restaurant v. Superior Court, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 688 (Oct. 22, 2008) (petition for review granted; case argued November 8, 2011), which addressed meal and rest break issues and in which all the justices uniformly appeared not to understand the fundamental role of the law in providing employees with basic rights, such as meal and rest periods.

Jody LeWitter

November 20, 2011

Mr. Kasten was fired by Saint-Gobain because he complained that the company prevented its workers from being paid for the time they spent "donning and doffing" (putting on required protective gear). He claimed that the location of the company's time clocks caused this problem. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic Corp., __ U.S. __ (March 22, 2011).

The Fair Labor Standards Act prohibits employers from discharging "any employee because such employee has filed any complaint" asserting a violation of the Act. 29 U.S.C. Section 215(a)(3). This case turned solely upon the Supreme Court's holding that the phrase "filed any complaint" includes the making of an oral complaint, here to Saint-Gobain's officials.

The Court held that the "purpose and context" of the anti-retaliation provision led it to this interpretation. It noted that very real problems could occur if the provision did not protect those who complained orally: it could prevent government agencies from using hotlines; it could discourage the use of informal workplace grievance procedures; and it could make it difficult for workers who are less educated to complain. This led the Court to adopt a broad interpretation of the statute.

It is a cause for celebration every time this Supreme Court, with its largely pro-business slant, votes for the rights and concerns of employees. This case does provide more protection for employees around the country who complain about wage and hour violations, although the Ninth Circuit had, already, interpreted FLSA this way, to include oral complaints and thus California employees were already protected when making oral complaints. Lambert v Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999).

The Court did note that Saint-Gobain argued to the Supreme Court that FLSA's anti-retaliation provision only applied to complaints to the government, not to private employers. Holding that Saint-Gobain abandoned this argument, the Court may have unnecessarily muddied the waters around this issue, as complaints to the employer, private or otherwise, are just the types of complaints that have historically been protected. Over ten years ago, the Ninth Circuit, noting well established law, clearly ruled that complaints to the employer are protected. Lambert v Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999). Indeed, if the "purpose and context" of FLSA's anti-retaliation provision covers oral complains, it should covers complaints to non-governmental organizations and complaints by an employee to his or her own employer. After all, it would be illogical for this Supreme Court to urge employees to go straight to the government to complain about FLSA violations and leave the employer/private business out of the loop.

Jody LeWitterApril 7, 2011